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670 PEOPLE v. KOLEZ [23 C.2d 
may well have concluded that the acts or misconduct charged 
against petitioner were those of its admitted superintendent. 
Scanland, whe> was actively supervising the job in question, 
who made frequent tours of inspection, and who was familiar 
with the safety order, who knew that it was not being ob-
served, who thought that the order applied only to loads 
transported over a public highway, and who failed in his 
responsibility of requiring strict compliance with it as to 
loads being moved on private property, he having admitted 
that some loads were not chained or otherwise secured against 
disp lacemen t. 
For the reasons above stated, the award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Traynor, J., and 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
rCrim. No. 4507. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1944.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. DAN KOLEZ, Appellant 
[1] Homicide-Instructions-Punishment-Discretion of Jury.-
An instruction to the jury that if they find the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree, with some extenuating facts or 
circumstances, it is within their discretion to pronounce such 
a sentence as will relieve him from the extreme penalty of the 
law, but that, if there were no extenuating circumstances, it is 
their duty to find a simple verdict of murder in the first degree 
and leave with the law the responsibility of fixing the punish-
.ment, is. not erroneous as circumscribing and controlling the 
discretion given to the jury by Pen. Code, § 190. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lassen 
County. Ben V. Curler, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Grover C. Julian for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, and T. G. Negrich, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
[1] See 13 Cal.Jur. 744; 26 Am.Jur. 533. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Homicide, § 238. 
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THE COURT.-An information was filed charging defen-
dant with the murder of Roscoe Edward Sutton fu Lassen 
County on December 25, 1942. Defendant pleaded not guilty 
and not guilty by reason of insanity. After trial, the jury 
returned a verdict findfug defendant guilty of murder in the 
first degree, without recommendation. Defendant then moved 
to withdraw the insanity plea. The trial court fuformed de-
fendant that as a result of the verdict there was no alternative 
except to pronounce the death sentence if he withdrew, his 
plea of insanity. Defendant and his 'counsel assured the 
court that they fully understood the effect of the verdict and 
in response to the court's inquiry stated that they still desired 
to withdraw the insanity plea. The motion to withdraw the 
plea was thereupon granted and defendant' was sentenced 
to death. He orally. announced this appeal from the judg-
ment. 
Defendant is a cook by trade and at the time of the homicide 
was employed in a restaurant at Doyle, Lassen County. De-
ceased was a regular patron of the restaurant. He died from 
stab wounds in the abdomen inflicted by defendant while the 
two men were in the restaurant. There was no eyewitness to 
the scuffle which preceded the stabbing, but the restaurant 
proprietor heard the noise incident thereto, and, turning,saw 
the deceased bending over and the defendant holding a knife, 
which the proprietor took from him. Apparently the' homi-
cide resulted from defendant's jealousy over attentions shown 
by the deceased to a waitress in the restaurant. 
No challenge is made as to the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict and judgment, and further statement 
of the facts surrounding commission of the homicide is there-
fore unnecessary. 
[1] Defendant's sole contention upon this appeal is that 
the trial court erred in giving the following instruction: 
"If the Jury in this case s.rould find the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree, and they also shall find the 
further fact that there are some extenuating circumstances 
or facts in the case, it is within their discretion to pronounce 
such a sentence as will relieve the defendant from the extreme 
'penalty of the law. The Penal Code invests a Jury in a 
criminal case of murder with the discretion, limited to deter-
mining which of two punishments shall be inflicted, and is to be employed, only when the Jury is satisfied that the lighter 
. i 
, i 
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penalty should be imposed. If the evidence shows the defen-
dant to be guilty of murder in the first degree, but does not 
show some extenuating facts or circumstances, it is the duty 
of the Jury to find a simple verdict of murder in the first 
degree, and leave with the law the responsibility of fixing the 
puni.,hment. " 
Defendant argues that this instruction is prejudicially er-
roneous as an attempt on the part of the trial court to cir-
cumscribe and control the discretion given to the jury in 
such cases by section 190 of the Penal Code, which reads: 
"Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suf-
fer death, or confinement in the state prison for life. at the 
discretion of the jury trying the same; ... " The trial court 
also gave an instruction in the language of the code section. 
It has been held in a long line of decisions that the giving of 
an instruction similar to the one above quoted is not erroneous. 
(People v. Jones, 63 Cal. 168, 169-170; People v. Murback, 
64 Cal. 369, 370 [30 P. 608] j People v. Brick, 68 Cal. 190, 
191-192 [8 P. 858] ; People v. Olsen,· 80 Cal. 122, 128 [22 P. 
125] ; People v. Bawden, 90 Cal. 195, 197-198 [27 P. 204]; 
People v. Rogers, 163 Cal. 476, 483-484 [126 P. 143] ; People 
v. Harris, 169 Cal. 53, 70 [145 P. 520] j People v. Wolfgang, 
192 Cal. 754, 761-762 [221 P. 907] ; People v. Reid, 193 Cal. 
491, 496 [225 P. 859] j People v. Oasade, 194 Cal. 679, 682-
683 [230 P. 9] ; People v. Perry, 195 CaL 623, 640 [234 P. 
890] ; People v. Oraig, 196 Cal. 19, 28 [235 P. 721] j People 
v. Bollinger, 196 Cal. 191, 207 [237 P. 25] j People v. Arnold, 
199 Cal. 471, 500 [250 P. 168] j People v. King, 13 Ca1.2d 
521, 525 [90 P.2d 291] j People v. Smith, 15 Cal.2d 640, 651 
[104 P.2d 510] j cf. People v. Smith, 13 Cal.2d 223, 228 [88 
P.2d 682]; and see People v. Welch, 49 Cal. 174, 178.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. Section 190 of the Penal Code 
in providing that the punishment for first degree murder is 
life imprisonment or death "in the discretion of the jury" 
imposes no limitation on that discretion. The Legislature 
did not distinguish between one kind of first degree murder 
and another, nor did it establish death as the ordinary pun-
ishment for first degree murder and life imprisonment as the 
exceptional one. The IJegislature did not prescribe, nor did 
it authorize the court to prescri1::.e, rules to govern which 
Feb. 1944] PEOPLE V. KOLEZ 
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punishment should be imposed but "confided th? power to 
affix the punishment between these two alternatlves to the 
absolute discretion of the jury." (People v. Leary, 105 Cal. 
486 495-496 [39 P. 24].) It thus left it to the jury to de-cid~ whether capital punishment should be invoked. "The 
authority of the jury to decide that the accused shall not be 
punished capitally is not limited to cases in. w~ich the .c~urt, 
or the jury, is of opinion that there are pallIatmg 0: mltl~at­
ing circumstances. But it extends to ev~ry c~se m w.hl~h, 
upon a view of the whole evidence, the Jury IS of opl111on 
that it would not be just or wise to impose capital punish-
ment .... " (Winston v. United States, Strather v. United 
States, and Smith v. United States, 172 U.S. 303,813- [19 S, 
Ct. 212, 43 L. Ed. 456], quoted in People v. Bollinger, 196 Cal. 
191, 206 [237 P. 25] ; see Bye, Capital Punishment, 17 Jour-
nal of Amer. lnst. of Crim. Law, pp. 234, 236.) 
The trial court in the present case limited the jury's dis-
." These cases involved the act of Congress of January 15, 1897, chap· 
ter 29, 29 Stats. at Large, 487, which reads in pa.rt: 'In all cas~s whe~e 
the accused is found guilty of murder .•. the Jury may qualIfy then 
verdict by adding thereto" without capital punishment"; and whel!ever 
the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid the per~on con':lc~ed 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment at hald lab?r f.or h~e. The JUrles 
in thOS\l cases were instructed ill effect that then discretion was not ~ 
arbitrary one and that. the qu~li~Lation ~~oul~ be .added to the verdIct 
only in those cases showmg palhatmg or mltIgatmg cncumstances,. In con· 
demning the instructions and reversing the judgmtlnts, the court sald: 
" 'The right to qualify a verdict uf guilty by adding the words" with· 
out capital punishment," is thus ccnf~rred upon the jury in all cases of 
murder. The act does not itself prescrIbe, ncr authoriZE> the court to pre· 
scribe, any rule defining or cir~uruBcrib~ng the exe~cise of this right; but 
commits the whole matter of Its exercIse to the .Judgment and the con· 
sciunces of the jury. The authority of the jury to decide that the accused 
shall not be punished capitally is not limited. to. cases in. ,!hi~ the. court, 
or the jury, is of opinion that there a.re pa~hatmg or ~tigating Clfcum· 
stances. But it extends to every ease m which, upon a. Vlew of ~he w~Ole 
evidence, the jury is of opinion that it woUld not be Just or WIse to lID· 
pose capital punishment ... 
" 'The instructions of the judge to the jury, in each of the three casell 
now befol'e this court, clearly gave t}1e jury to underst8;nd thll;t the ~ct 
of Congress did not intend or authorlze the jury to quahfy .then verdict 
by the addition of the words' without ea.pital punishment,' unless mitigat-
ing or palliating circumstances were proved. 
,. '·This court is of opinion that these instructions were erroneous in 
matter of law as undertaking to control the discretionary power .vested 
by Congress i~ the jury, and as attributing to Congre&s an intention un· _ 
warranted either by the express words or by the apparent purpose of the 
statute; ... ' " (People v. BollingeT,196 Cal. 191,206.207 [237 P. 25].) 
23 C.2d-1I2 
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cretion in this respect by instructing it that "If the evidence 
shows the defendant to be guilty of murder in the first de-
gree, but does not show some extenuating facts or circum-
stances, it is the duty of the jury to find a simple verdict of 
murder in the first degree, and leave with the law the respon-
sibility of fixing the punishment." In disregard of the stat-
ute, the court usurped the power of the jury to determine the 
considerations that would govern its choice of one punishment 
or the other. Moreover it decided, without statutory author-
ity, that death should be the ordinary punishment for first 
degree murder and life imprisonment the exceptional one. 
It thereby greatly reduced the chances of the jury's imposing 
the lesser sentence to the prejudice of the defendant. It was 
the duty of the jury to follow the court's instructions, and 
since it was not permitted to exercise the discretion plainly 
given it by the statute, there are no grounds for holding that 
a different result would have been improbable had the in-
struction not been given. (Peop~e v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 
892 [129 P.2d 367].) "The proper practice for the trial 
court is to refrain from giving any instructions which might 
have a tendency in the slightest degree to influence or con-
trol the discretion of the jury in its determination of the 
proper penalty in a case where the defendant is charged with 
murder in the first degree." (People v. Martin, 12 Ca1.2d 
466,470-471 [85 P.2d 880].) 
For over fifty years precedents have accumulated condemn-
ing such instructions, even though the court has fallen short 
of reversing judgments because of them. As early as 1891, 
in People v. Bawden, 90 Cal. 195 [27 P. 204], the court said, 
"It is to be hoped, however, that trial courts will not make 
further excursions into this doubtful domain." In 1912, when 
the instruction was challenged, the court declared that such 
an instruction was not error, but that "If the question pre-
sented were a new one, there would be strong reasons for 
holding in accord with defendant's claim." (People v. 
Rogers, 163 Cal. 476, 483-484 [126 P. 143].) In 1925, in 
People v. Bollinger, 196 Cal. 191, 207-209 [237 P. 25], the 
court expressed itself in more emphatic terms: "In our opin-
ion, the trial court should never instruct the jury as to how 
the discretion should be exercised .... While we are satisfied 
that the giving of such instructions is opposed to the provi-
sions of section 190 of the Penal Code, we are not prepared to 
I 
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depart from the decisions on this point .... We have, however, 
gone into the subject in the hope, if not the expectation, that 
the practice of giving such instructions may be abated, thus 
giving assurance that the penalty reflects the decision of the 
jury alone. . . . And considering the number of times this 
court has held that section 190 confers on the jury alone 
the discretion of determining the punishment in cases of 
guilt of murder in the first degree, trial courts, especially 
where a human life is at stake, should not interfere with the 
discharge of that solemn duty by the jury." (See, also, 
People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256, 258-259 [66 P. 229] ; People v. 
Martin, supra.) . In 1939, in People v. Smith, 13 Ca1.2d 223 
[88 P.2d 682], the court again declared that such an instruc~ 
tion violated Penal Code section 190, adding, "Just why this 
and similar warnings by this court have not been observed 
by prosecuting officers and trial courts, we are at a loss to· 
understand. " It stated that such an instruction niight be 
a ground for reversing the trial court, even though it con-
cluded that under the facts of that case the possibility that 
the jury might have voted for life imprisonment was so re-
mote that prejudice could not be assumed. 
The court has thus been unwilling to overrule the cases 
holding that it is not error to give the instruction in question· 
but has also been unwilling to hold that it is proper to give 
it. It has thus placed itself in the inconsistent position of 
tolerating the giving of an instruction that it condemns. It 
has sought to overcome this inconsistency by admonishing 
trial courts not to give the instruction. There can be no such 
middle ground, however. If the instruction is not erroneous 
it is quite proper for trial courts to give it and an unwar~ 
ranted interference for this court to admonish them not to 
give it. If the instruction is erroneous it should be held to 
be so outright. The dilemma is not resolved but perpetuated 
when this court, in deference to precedent, sanctions an in-
correct instruction and at the same time admonishes the trial 
court to cease giving it. The repeated disregard of· such ad-
monitions demonstrates that if the correct rule is to be ap-
plied, this court must join in its enforcement and reverse the 
judgments of trial courts that vitiate it. Disregard of ad-
monitions of this court in the past has been held to indicate 
an attempt to influence the jury impropfJrly and therefore to 
constitute ground for reversal. (People v. Maughs, 149 Cal. 
676 ESTATE OF WAITS [23 C.2d 
253, 263 [86 P. 187] ; People v. Costello, 21 Ca1.2d 760 [135 
P.2d 164]; see People v. Ryan, 152 Cal. ~64 [92 P. 853].) 
There can be no justifiable reliance on decisions allowing this 
instruction in view of the repeated warnings by this court 
that district attorneys should not offer and trial courts should 
not give it. A decision that cannot properly be relied upon 
cannot serve to justify adherence to an interpretation it con-
demns. Nothing is gained and much is lost by insisting upon 
a mechanical adherence to precedent that perpetuates an ad-
mittedly erroneous interpretation of a statute and defeats 
the very purpose of the Legislature in enacting it. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 16906. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.] 
Estate of FREDERICK ALBERT W AIT~, Deceased. THE 
ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, v. CHAR-
LOTTE E. LEET, as Administratrix, etc., Respondent. 
[So F. No. 16907. In Bank. Feb. 10, 1944.] 
Estate of IVAN R. MILLER, Deceased. THE ATCHISON, 
TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY (a 
Corporation), Appellant, v. CHARLOTTE E. LEET, as 
Administratrix, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Decedents' Estates - Jurisdiction - Existence of Property-
Cause of Action for Death.-A cause of action for wrongful 
death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S. 
C.A., § 51 et seq.) is "estate" within Prob. Code, § 301; au-
thorizing the probate court to appoint an administrator, 
even though the decedent was not a resident of the state and 
there are no other assets. 
[2] Id. - Jurisdiction - Situs of Property - Choses in Action.-
Under the rule that a debt will be regarded as an asset 
[1] Cause of action for death as justifying appointment of 
administrator, note, 59 A.L.R. 92. See, also, 21 Am.Jur. 396. 
[2] See 11A Cal.Jur. 114; 21 Am.Jur. 401. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1, 2] Decedents' Estates, § 4L 
Feb. 1944] ESTATE OF WAITS 
[23 C.2d 676] 
677 
wherever the debtor is subject to suit, a cause of action for 
wrongful death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act 
has a situs, for purposes of administration, in any county 
where the defendant does business. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Alameda 
County refusing to set aside appointment of an administra-
trix. Leon E. Gray, Judge. Affirmed. 
J. C. Gibson, Leo E. Sievert, H. K. Lockwood and L. W; 
Butterfield for Appellant. 
Hildebrand, Bills & McLeod and Louis H. Brownstone for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, The Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Railway Company, appeals from two orders deny-
ing motions to set aside the appointment of Charlotte E. 
Leet as administratrix of the estate of Ivail. R. Miller and 
of the estate of Frederick Albert Waits. These appeals have 
been consolidated because they involve substantially the same 
facts and the same legal question. The petitions for letters 
of administration were filed in the Superior Court of Ala-
meda County on August 15, 1942. The petition in the Miller 
estate alleged that Ivan R. Miller was a resident of Al-
buquerque, New Mexico, where he died, and that "it is nec-
essary that an Administratrix be appointed in order to pros-
ecute a claim for damages against said Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Railroad Co., for the death of said deceased, under 
the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 
U.S.C.A., sec. 51 et seq.) ; that under the provisions of said 
act, such suit, although prosecuted in the name of the Ad-
ministratrix, is for the benefit of the mother of said decedent, 
and that any recovery in such action belongs to the mother 
of said decedent as his heir at law, and is not a part of the 
estate of said decedent .... " The petition also alleged that 
the foregoing claim is the sole estate of said decedent. The 
allegations of the petition in Estate of Waits were identical, 
except that there it appeared that Frederick Albert Waits, 
who died in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was a resident of 
Navajo County, Arizona, and that any recovery under the 
liability act would be for the benefit of his wife and minor 
son. On September 18, 1942, these petitions were .granted, 
